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On 27 September, 2015, on the first anniversary of the National Unity Government, the Taliban took over the city center of Kunduz, Afghanistan.
Kunduz has since been reclaimed by Afghan Government forces, proving the Taliban’s inability from conducting a proper static defense necessary
for holding a large amount of territory. The battle of Kunduz is yet another sign that there can be no reaching peace with the Taliban. The notion that
the Taliban and the current Afghan government can coexist peacefully is a myth. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Taliban’s recent attack on
Kunduz, their violence has been well documented by Amnesty International.
Earlier this year a Chinese and Pakistani initiated attempt at détente with the Taliban unraveled quickly in the aftermath of the news of Mullah
Omar’s death. Let us not forget that the Taliban adhere to a barbaric code of a religion they claim is Islam. Their convoluted interpretation of Islam
makes the Saudi based Wahhabis look like the men of the European Enlightenment. Establishing peace with the Taliban is both morally
objectionable and illogical because it will be tantamount to legitimizing a proxy force subservient to Pakistan’s interests. It will continue to impose
barbarity on the people of Afghanistan while causing regional instability, and promoting international terrorism — as was seen in the 1990s.
Pakistan’s Irregular Warfare Campaign
In 2013, with the backing and urging of Pakistan’s then Army Chief Parvez Kayani, the U.S. agreed to enter into peace talks with the Taliban.[1] The
arrangement orchestrated by Pakistan made the U.S. appear weak and flailing; resulting in a strategic victory for the Taliban. One of the principle
reasons why peace with the Taliban will not be achieved is because they remain a proxy force used by Pakistan to weaken the Afghan state;
thereby ensuring that Islamabad’s equities are intact. Pakistan has waged an unconventional war against the Afghan State since the early 1960s.
U.S. Army Special Forces Officer Douglas Livermore’s essay, “Pakistani Unconventional Warfare Against Afghanistan ,” outlines this case at great
length.[2]
Ahmad Shah Massoud (Left) and Gulbudun Hektmatyar (Right), attempted to overthrow the Afghan government in the early 1970's,
and replace it with a Pakistani backed Islamist regime.
Pakistan has relied on a long list of proxy forces and unabashed interference in Afghan affairs. Starting from Ahmad Shah Massoud and Gulbudin
Hektmayar’s failed coup attempts in the early 1970s against the presidency of Sardar Muhammad Doud Khan[3], to the funneling of weapons to the
most extreme and radical mujahedeen groups such as Abdul Rasoul Sayaf, and yet again Gulbudin Hekymatyar in the 1980s, to training and
equipping the Taliban in the 1990s[4]. Perhaps the most disturbing act by Pakistan was “Operation Evil Airlift,” which reportedly allowed President
Musharraf to pull out members of the ISI, the Pakistani military, and foreign fighters out of Kunduz, Afghanistan in November of 2001.[5] This was
happening, all the while U.S. Special Forces and the Northern Alliance were attempting to clear the city of terrorists. You can read more about that
here and here.
1/3
Pakistani fears of losing “Pashtunistan” has shaped its Afghan-policy.
Why Does Pakistan Support the Taliban?
Pakistan has two reasons for its intransigence. The first reason is driven by the fear of partition and separation. The Durand
Line (depicted in red) splits the Pashtun ethnic groups into two states, Pakistan and Afghanistan, this fear of losing territory
has caused Pakistan to employ shrewd statecraft and irregular warfare against
Afghanistan.
The Pashtuns are the dominant ethnic group in Afghanistan, and except for a
short period in the early 1920s and 1990s, Pashtuns have always held the reigns
of the Afghan government. Pakistan fears that a strong Afghan state with a
nationalistic agenda would attempt to reclaim Pashtun territories (about 1/3 of
Pakistan). In essence, reclaim what is known as “Pashtunistan.” From Pakistan’s
lens, this loss of Pashtunistan would likely encourage the Baloch, Sinhdis, and
other ethnic groups to obtain their own independence. This would leave Punjab to
Pakistan, in essence Pakistan would only be “Punjabistan”. Therefore, keeping a
weak an inept Afghanistan in line with Islamabad’s has been one of Pakistan’s
primary foreign policy pillars. The only Afghan government that has not
challenged Pakistan over the Durand Line was the Taliban. Thus, for Pakistan the
Taliban remains just the type of government and puppet state that Pakistan wants
to see on her northern and western flanks.
The second reason for Pakistan to back the Taliban and press for peace talks is
its misguided notion of “strategic depth.” Pakistan believes that a friendly and
subservient government in Kabul will act as strategic depth in the event that
Pakistan becomes involved in a conventional war with India.[6] Pakistan’s narrow
body of land would require their army to fall back into Afghan territory in order to
properly defend itself against a conventional Indian force, which is superior to her
own. Kabul’s historically friendly relationship with New Delhi has also added to
Pakistani paranoia. Since its birth, Pakistan’s foreign policy has been formulated on its founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s famous dictum that
Pakistan is “moth-eaten and truncated.”[7] This paranoid assessment of its standing among Pakistan’s neighbors, has colored most of its foreign
policy decisions. Pakistan lives in fear of another Indian-instigated vivisection; just like the secession of Bangladesh in 1971. Only this time it might
be with assistance from a strong willed government in Kabul. As long as Pakistan does not let go of its paranoia, it will do its utmost to place the
Taliban or a Taliban type government in Kabul.
So, while Pakistan has pushed for peace talks with the Taliban, peace with them only benefits the state of Pakistan. Pakistan’s view of peace with
the Taliban entails the placement of actual, dyed-in-the-wool Taliban ideologues in the ranks of the Afghan civilian and military establishments. This
would result in infiltration of Afghan military and civilian cadres, by pro-Wahhabi partisans from Hekmatyar’s Hezbi-Islami and the Haqqani network.
The Taliban executing an Afghan women in Kabul during their
reign of terror.
What Needs to Happen
Establishing sustainable peace in Afghanistan, and the region at large,
requires the total and unequivocal neutralization of the Taliban as a
viable fighting force. This is because the Taliban and peace are
antithetical to each other. Defeat of the Taliban requires a broad based
international effort to dissuade the Pakistani government from
supporting Taliban action in Afghanistan. The U.S. policy in particular
should be geared at rendering Islamabad either incapable of aiding the
Taliban or unwilling to do so. Declaring the Taliban as a foreign terrorist
organization is the first step. After all, an insurgent force without
protected safe-havens, financial institutions, resources, materiel,
logistics capabilities, and a host-state will be unable to survive for long.
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The Afghan government needs to self-reform, and take the business of governance seriously. Time is not on their side.
The Afghan Government
Lastly, the Afghan government needs to break away from years of ethnic rivalry, corruption, and nepotism. It must be able to garner the trust of its
own population as a respected and legitimate government — failure to do so, only emboldens the insurgency. Afghanistan needs a unity government
with a focus on creating opportunities for a nation state, rather than filling their own coffers for personal gain. If it continues on its current path of
incompetence and perversion, then there will more cities like Kunduz that will fall. Afghanistan’s renegade warlords, generals, and security officials
need to pay attention.
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